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Abstract
This article undertakes a comparative analysis of special education policy through the juxtaposition 
of two recent Supreme Court actions: Allston v. Lower Merion School District (2015) and Endrew F. v. 
Douglas County School District (2017). This comparison reveals an ordering of special education 
policy around questions of race. Specifically, this article argues that special education policy is gov-
erned by a racecraft of disability labeling that defines students of color as variously disabled and 
through a biopolitics of special education that expands disability services for individual students who 
are within the truth demarcated by scientific- juridical mediations of life. Against such negative inflec-
tions of life, this article concludes by turning to John Dewey’s educational and democratic thinking to 
posit an affirmation of educational life that counters the morbid symptoms that presently define edu-
cation’s interregnum.
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On April 6, 2015, the Supreme Court denied Allston v. Lower Merion School District a writ of certiorari. Allston had sought legal redress for 
what the Petitioners argued was persistent, significant, and 
systematic racial discrimination. Central to this argument was the 
legal claim that Lower Merion School District (LMSD) had 
wrongly identified African American students as learning disabled 
and had as such disproportionality placed and kept Black students 
in special education environments, depriving the Petitioners of 
appropriate educations. Given the extent of racial discrimination, 
the Petitioners sought legal redress under Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act originally before the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and then before the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit. On October 20, 2011, District Judge Harvey 
Bartle III granted summary judgment for LMSD, holding that the 
Petitioners had failed to produce sufficient evidence of racial 
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discrimination. This holding was affirmed in a 2– 1 decision by the 
Third Circuit on September 12, 2014, and on October 29, 2014,  
the Court of Appeals denied the Petitioners’ request for an en banc 
hearing.
The denial of certiorari for Allston helps to narrate the ways 
special education policy is implicated in a troubled history of racial 
discrimination in American education. As many scholars (Artiles, 
2011; Connor & Ferri, 2005; Ferri & Connor, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; 
Harry & Klinger, 2006; Losen & Orfield, 2002) have noted, the 
disproportionate placements of Black students in special education 
classes subverts Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and facilitates 
the resegregation of American education. While denial of certiorari 
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is not a legal decision and as such does not indicate a holding for 
either the Petitioner or the Respondent, reviewing the latter’s Brief 
in Opposition shows the line of reasoning presented to the 
Supreme Court concerning the uses of disability labeling within, 
by, and for special education policy. In responding to the Petition, 
LMSD presented four arguments. First, the Third Circuit’s holding 
involved application of well- settled law, and claims that it con-
flicted with other courts of appeals were fabricated. Second, the 
Petition did not raise a viable legal argument, but instead simply 
asked the Supreme Court to view the facts of the case differently 
and was thus nothing more than a request for error correction. 
Third, statistical and circumstantial evidence of the overrepresen-
tation and disproportionate placements of minority students is 
not, in and of itself, probative. On this point, LMSD, citing the 
Third Circuit’s majority opinion, argued that “each individual 
student’s educational needs had been assessed and satisfied 
through a thorough individualized IEP [individual education 
program] process” (“Respondents Brief in Opposition,” Allston v. 
Lower Merion School District, 2015, 3). Finally, LMSD argued that 
the Court’s intervention was unwarranted given the Petitioners’ 
ever- shifting positions “regarding the basic question of whether 
they are or are not disabled within the meaning of the [Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act] IDEA” (“Respondents Brief in 
Opposition,” Allston v. Lower Merion School District, 2015, 5).
The importance Allston has on special education policy is 
brought into relief through its juxtaposition with the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School 
District (2017). On March 22, 2017, the Court unanimously held 
that Douglas County School District (DCSD) had failed to meet its 
substantive obligation under the IDEA to offer Endrew F. an IEP 
reasonably calculated to allow him to make adequate yearly 
progress appropriate to his circumstance as a child with autism. 
This holding vacated a previous decision by the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, which had held that to meet the intent of the 
IDEA, school districts simply needed to provide minimal special 
education services. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John 
Roberts argued that the Tenth Circuit had wrongly interpreted the 
IDEA in maintaining that DCSD had met its substantive obligation 
to Endrew F. because it had done “merely more than de minimis.” 
Against this limited legal interpretation, the Court established the 
more expansive standard that special education must be “appropri-
ately ambitious” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District,  
2017, 8). and should allow all children “the chance to meet chal-
lenging objectives” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 
2017, 14). While Endrew raised a number of important questions 
about what legally constitutes free and appropriate educations, its 
juxtaposition with Allston raises a more immediate question: 
“What’s so special about special education for poor and minority 
children” (Colker, 2013, p. 2)?
In juxtaposing Allston and Endrew, this essay is interested in 
how special education policy juridically constructs individuals 
through scientific classifications that inhere disabilities as discrete 
rights. What results is a special educational interregnum within 
which “disability ‘harms’ and ‘injuries’ are only deemed bona fide 
within a framework of scaled- down disability definitions (read: 
fictions) elevated to indisputable truth- claims and rendered visible 
in law” (Campbell, 2009, p. 110). Gramsci (1971) defined interreg-
num as a period of crisis between regimes during which “the crisis 
consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appear” (p. 276). Interregnum is a helpful analytic for 
noting the ways educational life is increasingly experienced 
through inflections of what Foucault (1990) discussed as biopoli-
tics. Allston and Endrew provide a way of philosophically reflecting 
on the movement between educational regimes and on how these 
moves inflect student lives differently. Read together, these cases 
suggest juridical uses of classificatory science toward individual 
determinations of disabilities that preclude redress of the collective 
effects of racial discrimination and thus the birth of new condi-
tions of educational life.
As Collins (2015) has demonstrated, legal juxtapositions 
evidence how special education policy exploits the interstice of 
race and disability toward the dislocation of Black lives. Given that 
special education is increasingly mediated legally, attending to 
cases that put into conversation how the Supreme Court’s response 
to the uses of disability labeling differs when race is a constitutive 
factor is important for understanding the interregnum that 
presently structures American education. While Endrew has been 
celebrated by disability rights advocates, viewed against Allston, it 
reveals a morbid “biopedagogy” (Lewis, 2009), the lesson of which 
is that educational life is most easily imaged negatively as not 
disabled and as non- Black. The juxtaposition undertaken here is 
motivated by noticing how affirming educational life is made 
difficult by what Campbell and Sitze (2013) described as “biopoliti-
cal racism,” that is, a racism that explains why, despite prolonged 
institutional attempts at inclusion, “certain populations neverthe-
less seem permanently incapable of achieving flourishing lives 
within those institutions” (p. 19). For Foucault (1990), biopolitics 
contingently qualifies which lives are deserving/eligible of foster-
ing and disallows those lives deemed as undeserving/ineligible. 
These qualifications make life both a location for historical inquiry 
and a site of future political- economic speculations. It is within 
these legally mediated qualifications that students of color must 
navigate their educational futures. As this introduction suggests, 
these efforts can be disorienting as they requiring moving through 
legal ascriptions of one’s status within education.
That life has both a historicity and futuricity necessitates 
interrogating how special education policy uses inclusion to foster 
or disallow life. This interrogation is undertaken in two parts: First, 
by critiquing the normalizing dispositifs of ableism and Whiteness 
from the overlapping theoretical vantages of racecraft, DisCrit, and 
Critical Whiteness Studies; and second, through elaborating the 
policy implications of understanding intersections of race and 
disability as resulting from each moving between in/voluntary 
statuses. To illustrate these strange maneuverings, this second 
section undertakes genealogical readings of the learning disability 
(LD) label, the legal standard of separate but equal, and the 
psychological study of childhood. Each of these historical emer-
gences presupposes that everyone is always already included— 
both scientifically and juridically— within both schools and 
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society. Fundamental to critiquing ableism and Whiteness, then, is 
an affirmative ontological reframing of disability as definitionally 
questionable and politically contestable and an epistemic 
reorientation of the normate gaze away from the abled and raced 
Other and toward the pathological tendencies of the norm.
The Normalizing Educational Dispositifs of Ableism and 
Whiteness
While Endrew requires special education policy to do more than 
the minimum, it minimally disrupts the dispositifs of ableism and 
Whiteness. Taken together, ableism and Whiteness produce a 
present within which special education policy orders education 
generally first by qualifying what counts as an appropriate educa-
tion and then through individual assessments of who— which 
bodies— are eligible for and deserving of such educations. Moving 
from sovereign power to the necessity that modern subjects learn 
to properly conduct themselves according to norms— 
“architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philan-
thropic propositions” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194)— dispositifs are 
strategic responses to urgent needs that are reciprocally institu-
tional and discursive and that are experienced through the dual 
processes of functional overdetermination and strategic elabora-
tion. Turning to criminality, Foucault (1980) elaborated the 
workings of these processes. First, measurements of criminality 
produce conditions of delinquency within which individuals 
become subject to the legalistic construction of a delinquent 
milieu, which is invested in maintaining that delinquents have 
medically diagnosable behaviors. Having been overdetermined 
through medical discourses, criminality is transmogrified from 
being a negative legal effect (i.e., crime) to having positive political- 
economic purposes by its strategic elaboration into a medical 
profession (i.e., psychiatry) whose telos is the defense of society. 
This purpose produces ableist and racist conditions that assess 
every individual in society for the purpose of completing a picture 
of their heredity, ancestry, and childhood. While the derived 
images are often presented in court as if they were scientifically 
accurate, the genealogy of their knowledge is a eugenic defense of 
humanity against degeneration (Baker, 2002; Lewis, 2009).
Extended to schooling, preventing crime is presently elabo-
rated through the medical- legal overdetermination of a school- to- 
prison pipeline within which students of color, especially those 
with disabilities, are disproportionately dislocated (Adams & 
Erevelles, 2015). Applied here, the dispositifs of ableism and 
Whiteness function within special education policy by ableist 
overdeterminations that project ability as species- typical and 
through strategic elaborations of Whiteness as property (Harris, 
1993). Campbell (2009) noted that ableism is overdetermined  
by the construction of ableist ontological norms and through  
the epistemic maintenance of an abled/not- abled dualism. The 
resulting disableist milieu positions disability negatively, as 
something to be ameliorated without interrogating the norms that 
govern such efforts or those binary policies which maintain that 
persons are either disabled or abled. LMSD’s Response employed 
such reasoning not only to discredit the Petitioners’ argument that 
they had been misidentified but to also position these students’ 
disabilities negatively. The juxtaposition of Allston and Endrew 
thus evidences Campbell’s biopolitical observation that the “law’s 
investment in biomedicalism invokes a moral landscape wherein 
the unruly body is culpable and blameworthy (and thus held 
responsible) whereas the ‘real’ disabled body is innocent (thus 
deserving of legal protection)” (p. 35).
Within such investments, Allston emerges as part of a larger 
forgotten history of using institutional inclusion to disallow people 
of color flourishing lives. In contrast to the dualism used in Allston 
and the presumption employed by Endrew that particular disabili-
ties are discrete and deserving of protection, DisCrit questions 
either/or uses of disability labeling and contests reductive medical 
and social models of disability. Reading Critical Race Theory 
(CRT) and Disability Studies together, DisCrit “recognizes the 
shifting boundary between normal and abnormal, between ability 
and disability, and seeks to question ways in which race contributes 
to one being positioned on either side of the line” (Annamma, 
Connor, & Ferri, 2013, p. 10). Given its interrogation of either/or 
thinking and its attention to the uses of the race and dis/ability, 
DisCrit critically extends Dewey’s (1938/1997) critique of educa-
tional absolutisms. Viewed against, and in terms of, historically 
contingent articulations of the normed body as White, male, 
cis- gender, and able, DisCrit interrogates attempts to medically 
ground disabilities as biological impairments and to socially 
rationalize racial discrimination through scientifically neutral 
disability labels. In doing so, DisCrit highlights the scientificity of 
juridically sanctioned forms of racial discrimination and the 
politicality of scientifically assessed measures of race.
What results from these interrogations are disruptions to 
dichotomous and temporally linear uses of disability/ability and a 
critical appreciation for how special education policy variously 
constructs and maintains statuses of dis/ability. No longer an 
either/or, dis/ability embodies an educational use value that 
situates students of color and their White peers differently despite 
the presumed universality of inclusion. As bodies already marked 
by racism, students of color are more likely to experience dis/
ability from a positionality that dislocates them as being “at risk” 
and or as having cultural deficits in need of “fixing.” Uses of dis/
ability within special education policy ignore how the collective 
effects of racial discrimination dislocate students of color as 
“non- citizens and (no)bodies by the very social institutions (legal, 
educational, and rehabilitational) that are designed to protect, 
nurture, and empower them” (Erevelles & Minear, 2013, p. 355). 
Ultimately, DisCrit forces special education policy to contend with 
how race and dis/ability strangely maneuver between scientific  
and juridical adjudications and to acknowledge that “without 
racialized notions of ability, racial difference would simply be racial 
difference” (Annamma et al., 2013, p. 15).
Understood as a sleight of hand that is easy to miss, special 
education policy maneuvers through individualized conflations of 
race and dis/ability within which “racism and ableism often work 
in ways that are unspoken, yet racism validates and reinforces 
ableism, and ableism validates and reinforces racism” (Annamma 
et al., 2013, p. 6). Important to these maneuverings is that race and 
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dis/ability are taken for granted as objectively real. Fields and 
Fields (2014) defined these strange maneuverings within which 
“racism, something an aggressor does” is transformed into “race, 
something the target is” as racecraft (p. 17; original emphasis). 
Disability labeling furthers the taken- for- grantedness of race 
because it lends scientific explanations to social practices predi-
cated solely upon heredity, ancestry, and childhood. Noting the 
importance of recognizing the collective intersections of race and 
dis/ability, Ogbu (2004) drew critical attention to how a racecraft 
of disability labeling disallows students of color appropriate 
educations by dislocating minority identities as populational status 
problems:
Status problems are external forces that mark a group of people as a 
distinct segment from the rest of the population. A group so created is 
usually bounded and named . . . Status problems are collective 
problems which members of the subordinate group find difficult if not 
impossible to solve within existing systems of majority- minority 
relations. (p. 4)
Racecraft exposes the sumptuary codes behind the external 
forces that mark race for the purposes of creating populational 
groups. Moving through present- historical folk classifications of 
race, including contemporary uses of DNA, Fields and Fields 
(2014) demonstrated how racecraft “highlights the ability of pre-  
or non- scientific modes of thought to hijack the minds of the 
scientifically literate” (pp. 5– 6). A racecraft of disability labeling 
thus functions as both science and superstition. For example, while 
crime is the political- economic effect of a delinquent milieu, 
because criminals are believed to exist, their existence can be 
readily proven by testing prisoners for criminal genes. The capacity 
of racism to prove the existence of race while also disappearing 
behind ableist classifications helps explain why racecraft purpose-
fully invokes witchcraft, which also worked by maneuvering 
between scientific and superstitious descriptions to transform an 
epistemic label (witchcraft) into an ontological status (witches). 
Within the circularity of this circumstantial logic, “witchcraft has 
no moving parts of its own, and needs none. It acquires perfectly 
adequate moving parts when a person acts upon the reality of the 
imagined thing; the real action creates evidence for the imagined 
thing” (p. 22). Like the seemingly antiquated belief in witches, 
racism (and ableism) are thus an “action and a rationale for action, 
or both at once” (p. 17).
The critical frame of Whiteness lends further explanation to a 
racecraft of disability labeling and the formation of minority 
identities as status problems. The biopolitical racism of special 
education policy invokes what Leonardo (2009), extending Mills’s 
(1997) formulation, describes as a Racial Contract. The implicit 
consensus of this sumptuary codes is that students of color enter 
into a world already structured by state apparatuses, like schools, 
which function as “mechanisms of white power in a herrenvolk 
democracy where the dominant white group experiences liberty at 
the expense of the subordination of racial groups” (p. 52). Special 
education policy contractually obfuscates Whiteness through 
appropriately ambitious IEPs that at once codify personal sover-
eignty as scientific and reasons disabilities as juridically discrete. 
Such scientific- juridical adjudications disperse, by rendering 
invisible, the functionings of special education’s Racial Contract. 
While a Whitening of autism has been documented (Eyal, Hart, 
Oncular, Oren, & Rossi, 2010; Heilker, 2012), the critical reading of 
Endrew undertaken here is less concerned with knowing why 
White children are more likely to be diagnosed with autism and 
more interested with interrogating how the pathological tenden-
cies of ableism and Whiteness make it easier to discretely inhere a 
diagnosis that relies on eccentric expressions of personal sover-
eignty to bodies that are already interpolated as not only possessing 
rights but having rights based on their expected future use value. 
Both interpolating effects makes Whiteness, as Harris (1993) 
argued, a property.
Understood as an extension of Whiteness, rights are things 
that come to be possessed and leveraged as property by Whites as 
a dispensation from communal obligations. While rights are 
foundational to this possessive logic, as Leonardo and Broderick 
(2011) made evident, to whom disability rights inhere is contin-
gent upon a series of interest convergences that expand the 
juridical and scientific borders of Whiteness: “Whiteness as an 
ideology is untied to certain bodies,” rather it is an “articulation of 
disparate elements . . . that benefit Whites in absolute ways and 
minority groups relative only to one and other” (p. 2209). As a 
series of disparate elements, Whiteness recruits into its propertied 
borders identities that extend its political- economic reach. 
Endrew points to how juridical practices affirm individual lives as 
deserving of and eligible for fostering when they are recognized  
as sovereign and in possession of their disabilities. Arguing 
against these legal protections, Leonardo (2009) has noted that 
Whiteness as property requires first propertizing Black bodies and 
secondly transforming the political- economic benefits of this 
maneuver into common sense (p. 177). American jurisprudence is 
thus predicated upon Whiteness being a private possession whose 
immediate guarantee is indefinitely extended into the distance 
through legal protections that enclose life by rendering it private 
property.
Within this common sense, dis/ability often goes unrecog-
nized as a property due to the obfuscating effects of special 
education’s Racial Contract. In expanding the scope of IEPs, 
Endrew reinscribes individualized rights claims and property 
damages as the proper avenues for legally redressing misuses of 
special education. Accordingly, even when legal decisions are not 
ostensibly about race, Whiteness is still validated as a property with 
an expected future use value that is deserving of and eligible for 
legal protections. The appropriately ambitiousness of special 
education policy post- Endrew is thus likely to extend the biopoliti-
cal horizons of Whiteness to include dis/ability while continuing to 
define students of color as status problems who, because they are 
dislocated by the propertied logic of Whiteness, are likely to be 
included within special education policy as populational groups 
who are “at risk” or in need of “fixing.” Extending this reasoning, 
Campbell (2009) argued that the same interest convergences that 
govern special education’s Racial Contract also orders how the law 
narrates dis/ability. That is, similar strange maneuverings work to 
delimit the ability of students of color to legally redress racial 
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discrimination even while contingently qualifying dis/ability 
through a racecraft of disability labeling.
Turning to CRT, Campbell (2009) has noted that ableism, like 
Whiteness, also functions through dispersals. Campbell’s theoriz-
ing of dispersal echoes Ogbu’s (2004) arguments about the 
collective experiences Black students have with racism while also 
bringing into critical relief how the Racial Contract that governs 
special education policy displaces students of color into undesir-
able special education environments through a racecraft of 
disability labeling. Within the present interregnum, disablement  
is dispersed and ableism is emulated toward individualizations of 
disability labeling that often leave students of color to internalize 
their oppression or alter their selves toward performances that 
reinscribe Whiteness. Similar to how Whiteness renders special 
education’s Racial Contract invisible through interest convergen-
ces that appropriate dis/ability, the dispersal of ableism works by 
dislocating disablement as a non- normate way of being and 
stigmatizing difference often to the point of erasure. Dislocated 
special education classrooms and the resegregation of American 
education evidence this erasure as do racial performances like 
“acting white” (Ogbu, 2004) and ableist celebrations of exceptional 
persons who refuse to be defined by their disability. Each of these 
moments of erasure is witnessed by ableism and Whiteness as signs 
of progress, as inclusive movements toward a future negatively 
defined as not disabled and non- Black.
The Temporality and In/voluntariness of Race and Dis/ability
Attending to the biopolitical implications of Allston and Endrew 
suggests that in addition to joining life and special education policy 
through scientific- juridical adjudications, there is also a neoliberal 
logic that presumes everyone is already included within both 
schools and society. This logic requires individuals to articulate 
needs as a qualifying condition of their sovereignty. IEPs contrac-
tually structure this arrangement because the capacity to request 
educational resources qualifies individuals as sovereign beings in 
possession of their disabilities. By contrast, there is little invest-
ment in juridically undoing scientifically ascribed disability labels 
given that they have already satisfied special education’s Racial 
Contract. The juxtaposition of Allston and Endrew evidences how 
special education policy forces students of color to articulate harms 
that are populational and often aimed at undoing previously 
ascribed disability labels, even while it expands qualifying  
conditions for students who can articulate disabilities within an 
educational regime ordered by future personal and propertied 
inflections of life. Within this interregnum, there is not an outside 
to schooling or society; rather, individuals exist as part of a totality 
of other individuals, all of whom compete to successfully articulate 
their needs (Simons & Masschelein, 2015).
This individual/totality double bind means that no one is 
excluded from society even if particular populational groups are 
disallowed flourishing lives by its social institutions (i.e., schools). 
Instead, life is governed as if it were an individual political- 
economic domain of freedom. Extending biopolitical racism to 
legal questions of dis/ability, inclusion comes to mean that even 
though “certain people have ‘mental or physical handicaps’— in the 
traditional sense— [there] is not a reason to exclude them because 
they, like others, have their own needs, and each of their lives can 
include enterprises as much as can the respective lives of nonhand-
icapped people” (Simons & Masschelein, 2015, p. 217). Expected 
future economic- political uses of oneself as an enterprising 
individual govern how special education policy uses inclusion to 
overdetermine rights as strategic elaborations of a Racial Contract 
whose legal logics produce a “matrix of scientific ableism” (Camp-
bell, 2009, p. 33). IEPs do not equalize educational conditions as 
much as they reconfigure the allocation of educational resources 
through racially inflected scientific- juridical adjudications of  
dis/ability. Ogbu (2004) problematized this presumption, noting 
that “minorities experience their mistreatment regardless of their 
individual differences in education and ability, in status, physical 
appearance or place of residence” (p. 5).
This argument raises the importance of temporally engaging 
with special education policy. If, as Ogbu (2004) evidenced, 
minorities experience being interpolated as status problems across 
time, then special education policy functions atemporally toward 
students of color. In contrast to static formations of minorities as 
status problems, Whiteness can transmogrify its propertied 
borders to include dis/ability. Disability case law has similar 
temporal functionings that variously position everyone as already 
potentially disabled while also suggesting that disabilities are 
temporary given the existence of ameliorative technologies (e.g., 
cochlear implants). Further extending DisCrit into special 
education policy, this section attends to how race and dis/ability 
are made and unmade as in/voluntary statuses. First, this section 
reflects on Campbell’s (2009, 2015) legal observations that  
dis/ability classifications are mitigated by either/or medical- legal 
distinctions that presume individuals have either immutable 
(involuntary) or elective (voluntary) disabilities. A brief genealogy 
of the LD label evidences the capacity of special education policy to 
strangely maneuver between in/voluntary statuses. Next, this 
section genealogically explores the involuntary ways schooling 
forms the identities of students of color. Within the history of 
special education, two emergences evidence this formation: 
Roberts v. City of Boston (1849) and progressive- era studies of 
childhood. These events produce a temporal horizon against which 
race maneuvers strangely between in/voluntary dis/ability statuses.
In/voluntary distinctions of dis/ability make it something that 
is dependent upon degrees of amelioration. According to this 
reasoning, involuntary disabilities are deserving of and eligible for 
care, whereas voluntary disabilities are undeserving and ineligible 
for support because they result from individual choices. Campbell 
(2009, 2015) has suggested that voluntary disabilities require 
individuals to articulate their needs or else risk being sanctioned 
for not taking responsibility for their status problem. Disability 
case law, like recent case law that has converged to argue that 
African Americans no longer deserve electoral protections, is 
intended to delimit which bodies get access to disability labels by 
claiming that if everyone is potentially already disabled, then 
everyone is legally included within the matrix of scientific ableism. 
This reasoning precludes an understanding how disability labeling 
is used within special education policy. While Allston was 
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undoubtedly included within the meaning of the IDEA,  
its inclusion differed markedly from the appropriately ambitious 
inclusion mandated by Endrew.
The genealogy of the LD label attests to this difference. As 
Sleeter (1987) noted, the LD label emerged within the historical 
context of postwar American educational reform and was moti-
vated by a desire among White parents to see that their children 
were not labeled according to the extant psychological categories 
of mentally retarded, slow learner, emotionally disturbed, and 
culturally deprived. As originally conceived, the LD label was thus 
intended for failing White students whose poor academic perfor-
mances differed from those of students of color. In developing this 
label, psychologist borrowed diagnostic language from nineteenth-
 and twentieth- century medical studies of brain injuries to derive a 
“belief that some sort of organic defect causes some people 
difficulty in learning to read” (Sleeter, 1987, p. 225). Said differently: 
the LD label emerged as an involuntary disability. This use of the 
LD label was furthered by its statutory definition, which excluded 
children who have “learning problems which are primarily the 
result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, 
of emotional disturbance, or environmental, cultural, or economic 
disadvantage” (Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975, 3). That the IDEA also excludes emotional disturbance in 
defining autism raises questions about the intended audiences  
of both labels and how disability labeling interacts with neoliberal 
uses of inclusion.
This is not to suggest that Endrew F.’s status as a child with 
autism is voluntary or that it should be read as a fiction; the intent 
is rather to bring into critical relief how the present neoliberal 
interregnum is more likely to recognize the immutability of 
discrete disabilities than the involuntary statutes ascribed to 
racialized minorities. This is because American jurisprudence 
inflects Allston and Endrew differently. Endrew is an instance of 
redressing a personal injury and economic harm. The tragedy  
of Endrew is located in the future expected uses of education for 
which Endrew F. is both eligible and deserving but which 
inappropriate IEPs curtailed. By contrast, Allston is a moment of 
social injury that is collectively unjust but not tragic because each 
of the Petitioners needs were individually satisfied. The codifica-
tion of the LD label in the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act (1975) and the exclusion of emotional disturbance from the 
definition of autism found in the IDEA evidence how special 
education policy variously instantiates the in/voluntariness of  
dis/ability. Biopolitical materialities like environmental, cultural, 
or economic disadvantage as well as emotional disturbances 
instead reflect voluntary choices to live in poor neighborhoods or 
attend failing schools. The logic employed by LMSD parallels 
Campbell’s (2009, 2015) observation that individuals with disabili-
ties are expected to avail themselves of ameliorative technologies. 
Indeed, given the availability of such technologies, individuals who 
fail to do so might not be considered disabled within the meaning 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) because they should 
have chosen to mitigate their disability.
If the LD label emerged to protect the expected future uses 
White children’s educations, then the logic of separate but equal 
and progressive- era studies of childhood confirm how education 
orders the inclusion of children of color. Roberts prefigured the 
neoliberalization of inclusion through the logic of separate but 
equal while also foreshadowing a racecraft of disability labeling. 
Sarah Roberts was a young Black girl who sought redress before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court for having been denied admittance 
to White- only common schools. Central to Roberts’s claim was 
that she had to walk past five White- only schools to attend a 
Black- only school, which was some distance from her home. In 
finding for Boston, the court held that Roberts was not definition-
ally excluded from attending school because she was already legally 
included within Boston common schooling:
The plaintiff had access to a school, set apart for colored children, as 
well conducted in all respects, and as well fitted, in point of capacity 
and qualification of the instructors, to advance the education of 
children under seven years old, as the other primary schools . . . Under 
these circumstances, has the plaintiff been unlawfully excluded from 
public school instruction? Upon the best consideration we have been 
able to give the subject, the court are of the opinion that she has not. 
(p. 1708)
Deferring to the judgment of the Boston School Committee (BSC), 
the court argued that the BSC can legally prescribe qualifications 
for school admittance and thus organize common schooling as it 
deems fit. This meant that so long as a Black school was available, 
the BSC was operating statutorily. The court furthered this 
separate- but- equal logic by grounding Roberts’s segregation 
through an appeal to how the BSC established intermediate 
schools in response to what Osgood (1997) describes as an under-
mining of the common school ideal:
It has been found necessary, that is to say, highly expedient, at times, 
to establish special schools for poor and neglected children, who have 
passed the age of seven, and have become too old to attend the 
primary school, and yet have not acquired the rudiments of learning, 
to enable them to enter the ordinary schools . . . and it is expedient to 
organize them into a separate school, adapted to their condition. 
(p. 1710)
Inflecting Allston through Roberts evidences how inclusion is 
used to create discriminatory educational conditions. Reading 
these cases together, the following reasoning emerges: The 
Petitioners had access to an education even if it was set apart 
through special education practices that marked these students as 
learning disabled, according the expediency of a thoroughly 
individualized IEP process. Roberts also brings into critical relief a 
paradox of the Racial Contract. In the decades following the 
common school era, school attendance will become a legal 
mandate, which will require students of color to voluntarily submit 
themselves to a system of education that, as Baldwin (1963/1998) 
observed, is not intended for their lives. Marked by scientific 
classifications that move faster than the possibilities of legal 
redress, Ogbu (1990) warranted why Roberts found it difficult to 
redress her status problem within extant systems of race relations 
by arguing that African Americans experience schooling and 
society as involuntary minorities. In distinction to autonomous, or 
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numerical minorities (i.e., Jews and Mormons), and voluntary 
minorities, or immigrants whose previous cultural locations 
provide them with extant collective identities that tend to be 
understood by Whiteness as additive, involuntary minorities are 
“people who did not initially chose to become members of a 
society; rather they were brought into that society through slavery, 
conquest, or colonization” (p. 46).
Redress for persistent, significant, and systematic racial 
discrimination is difficult because such efforts reify the conceit that 
race is objectively real, despite being a scientific- juridical invention 
used for the explicit purpose of racial subordination. Extending 
this analysis, neoliberalism requires Roberts’s inclusion because 
democracies do not contractually exclude even if segregation 
remains an operative practice (Simons & Masschelein, 2015). 
Similarly, while LMSD argued that the Petitioners first desired and 
then sought to revoke their LD labels, statements from the 
Petitioners express frustration about the process of disability 
labeling. It was not, then, a series of ever- shifting positions that led 
some Petitioners to rescind previous requests for disability status 
but their experience with IEPs as delimiting their possibility  
of receiving appropriate educations. Baker’s (1998) genealogy of 
childhood is another reminder of how special education’s Racial 
Contract presumes a temporality that is applied differently to 
different student bodies. The emerging study of children, a 
historical precursor of special education, was predicated through-
out upon the construction of Blackness “as synonymous with 
‘savagery’ and with childhood at all ages,” which meant that “one 
could have a childhood only if one was eventually able to occupy 
adulthood;” and “one could not occupy adulthood if one was 
thought to have inherited ‘savagery’” (p. 127). The conclusion to 
this racist syllogism was that moving beyond childhood requires 
individual students to supersede Blackness, that is, to individually 
escape inappropriate educational conditions, a movement that 
education continues to define as educability. Furthermore, defined 
biopolitically and “encoded in the meaning of ‘scientific peda-
gogy,’” Blackness became “the property through which Whiteness 
could secure itself ” (p. 128).
Extending Harris (1993), possessing or “having” a childhood 
helps explain why, despite prolonged institutional attempts, 
students of color seem permanently incapable of achieving 
flourishing lives. Against the emergences of separate but equal and 
eugenic studies of childhood, Ogbu (2004) critiqued how the 
individualizing dispositifs of ableism and Whiteness continue to 
collectively dislocate involuntary minorities as educational status 
problems:
[I]nvoluntary minorities respond collectively as a group and they 
respond as individuals in ways that reinforce their existence and 
collective identity . . . That is, their very attempts to solve their status 
problem leads them to develop a new sense of who they are, that is in 
opposition to their understanding of who the dominant group 
members are. (p. 5)
Read together, Baker (1998), Campbell (2009, 2015), and Ogbu 
(1990, 2004) suggest that determinations of who— which 
bodies— get to “have” a childhood attests to how scientific 
reasoning superstitiously embodies and then puts to use childhood 
for particularizing biopolitical ends. Those colonial populations 
encountered through child study became involuntary minorities 
whose existence outside the temporality of Western civilization 
warranted their racial subordination because of their ascribed 
disabled and childlike statuses. This reasoning continues to justify 
special education interventions into the lives of children of color 
who remain eugenically positioned as being “at risk” and in need  
of “fixing.” Scientific speculations about the future qualifications of 
which lives matter finds a legalistic corollary in the uses of dis-
ability labeling to obscure the collective lived experiences of 
students of color in favor of already prescribed individual educa-
tional futures.
Allston and Endrew are contemporary examples of how 
special education policy both constructs and maintains  
in/voluntary statuses through convergent uses of race and  
dis/ability. One the one hand, Allston requires students of color to 
articulate harms that are collective while denying their collectively 
shared involuntary experiences with racism; on the other hand, 
Endrew expands individual rights for students with discrete 
disabilities who articulate individual injury as an economic harm 
that prevents their voluntary future uses of education. The 
collective harms being challenged by Allston are complicated by 
LMSD’s argument that the Petitioners’ disabilities were ever- 
shifting and thus potentially voluntary, whereas the regime of 
personal sovereignty being celebrated in Endrew is complicated by 
presumptions that discrete disabilities are involuntary and that 
rights inhere equally across the population despite being particular 
in their design and immunizing in their intent. Impacting this 
juxtaposition, Baker (2002) has argued that “institutions can make 
judgments about further categories such as race, class, sexuality, 
and gender by calling them ‘individual differences’ or something 
else (‘intelligence’) and refer for security’s sake to the exam results” 
(p. 694). Any examination, as Fields and Fields (2014) demon-
strated, results in an unequal rank ordering of individuals through 
sumptuary codes that always justify previous classifications and 
which already disallow those populational groups dislocated by the 
examination appropriate educational futures.
Conclusion: Affirming Educational Life
The temporality of race and dis/ability provides a critical backdrop 
against which the future possibilities of educational life can be 
addressed. A racecraft of disability labeling makes possible the 
continuing maintenance and construction of racial discrimination 
because special education policy attends to the amelioration of life 
by enclosing it within a propertied logic that values education 
according to its expected future use value. This temporality not 
only governs which disabilities are understood to be in/voluntary 
but also orders the inclusion of involuntary minorities within 
special education. The present- historical configurations of special 
education policy explored in the previous two sections attests to 
the uses of disability labeling to delimit the educational growth of 
students of color and to restrict their access to appropriate educa-
tions. In suggesting an affirmation of educational life, this conclud-
ing section gestures toward the life- affirming possibilities of 
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education understood as, Esposito (2008) has argued, the plural-
ization of life rather than protections of individual lives. 
Understood affirmatively, education becomes a space where the 
collective lived experiences of students of color are valued for their 
educational vitality. Such valuations take seriously Dewey’s 
(1916/1997) democratically motivated claim that “since education is 
not a means to living, but is identical with the operation of living a 
life which is fruitful and inherently significant, the only ultimate 
value which can be set up is just the process of living itself ” 
(pp. 239– 240).
Thinking through educational life affirmatively holds in 
attention how the inability to make life a norm toward which 
special education policy is articulated interdicts against the living 
possibilities of education. As education becomes more scientifi-
cally and juridically mediated, the possibilities of future growth 
become increasingly delimited. This means that education is 
inextricably biopolitical and raises the question of whether life can 
be preserved apart from its negative protections. The juxtaposition 
of Allston and Endrew is attentive to these particular embodi-
ments of educational life and to the uses of disability labeling to 
qualify life within education. Remembering Colker’s (2013) 
question, we might also ask: If education is something that cannot 
help but inflect life, how might education and life be read together 
to counter the morbidity of education’s present interregnum? What 
is needed contra apparatuses that secure the propertied futures of 
specific children are practices of education capable of releasing the 
biopolitical energy of childhood. Such practices must account for 
how race and dis/ability have genealogically defined educational 
life through a racecraft of disability labeling. Arguing against 
adherence to strict empiric definitions of childhood, Dewey 
(1902/1990) noted that the child and the curriculum are mutually 
constitutive forces rather than discrete essences:
Abandon the notion of subject- matter as something fixed and 
ready- made in itself, outside the child’s experience; cease thinking of 
the child’s experience as also something hard and fast; see it as 
something fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and 
the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process. 
(p. 189)
Following this formulation, children of color are no longer 
problem- solvers, which suggests a negative attention to deficits in 
intelligence and an overemphasis on ability, but become problem- 
posers, which means science is not something done by psycholo-
gists to them through eugenically motivated examinations but is 
something that is already a part of their everyday lived experiences. 
Within this formulation of educational life, the present becomes a 
problem for inquiry. If science has a troubling history of being 
applied to children of color, it is important to experiment with 
present life as a creative force through which these children can 
reinscribe the world with new collective meanings. In reconfigur-
ing the temporality of race and dis/ability through childhood, it is 
perhaps helpful to recall Dewey’s (1938/1997) own historical 
thinking: “the sound principle that the objectives of learning are in 
the future and its immediate materials are in present experience 
can be carried into effect only in the degree that present experience 
is stretched, as it were, backward. It can expand into the future only 
as it is enlarged into the past” (p. 77). A continuity of experience 
thus organizes both the lives of students of color and the life  
of education. The problem for education, then, is not a dearth of 
pedagogical situations or a lack of biopolitical energy, but a failure 
to utilize these situations and this energy methodologically. 
Understood as scientific inquirers in the world rather than objects 
of scientific study, children of color provide a way “for getting at the 
significance of our everyday experience of the world in which we 
live” and “a working pattern of the way in which and the conditions 
under which experiences are used to lead ever onward and 
outward” (p. 88).
To move onward and outward, education must recognize the 
increasing role special education policy plays in defining educa-
tional life and qualifying life within education as well as the ways 
either/or thinking continues to inform how such policies use race 
and dis/ability. For Leonardo (2009), any such confrontation will 
necessarily require practices of neo- abolition within which White 
students and parents own their racialization. This formulation 
attends to how Whiteness operates as property within special 
education policy without ever having to be owned by those who 
benefit from such operations. Critical Whiteness Studies brings 
into relief how certain disabilities can be possessed to the benefit  
of White students and parents without either having to own their 
Whiteness. Divesting special education policy from Whiteness 
thus requires first acknowledging how education is invested in 
perpetuating possessive neoliberal logics even while Whiteness 
forgets its past. In contrast to moments of forgetfulness, Ogbu 
(2004) noted that involuntary minorities tend to view the past as a 
condition of potential success that often stands in contrast to 
present iterations of poor school adjustment and academic 
performance. Echoing Leonardo, this temporal critique reminds 
special education policy how it ascribes disability labels onto 
students of color in ways that interpolate them as disabled often  
in contrast to these students’ past and present lived experiences. 
Constructed as such, involuntary minorities tend to view their 
cultural differences not as barriers to be overcome but as strengths 
that distinguish them from Whiteness. Accordingly, educational 
life for involuntary minorities is less about acquiring individual-
ized disability labels and more about collectively overcoming 
persistent, significant, and systematic racial discrimination.
While building an affirmative theory of educational life will 
have to be attentive to these insights, there is perhaps scaffolding 
already contained within Dewey’s (1938/1997) reflections on 
experience and education. In dispelling the either/or thinking that 
accompanied debates between traditional and progressive 
education, Dewey rejected dualisms that position experience  
and education, the child and the curriculum, and the school and 
society as oppositional. Instead of negations designed to protect 
life, Dewey argued for the creation of and/and spaces within  
which life might circulate as lived growth. This biopolitical 
formulation suggests that rather than imposing new scientific- 
juridical adjudications, special education policy should recog-
nize those experiences which already exist. Such affirmations make 
possible future critiques of how a neoliberal philosophy of life 
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cannot be understood apart from the lives such a philosophy 
makes possible while also providing entry into imagining educa-
tional life once again anew, as a practice of living.
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